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Local Option Sales Taxes and Fiscal Disparity:
The Case of Georgia Counties
ZHIRONG JERRY ZHAO and YILIN HOU
While local option sales taxes (LOST) have become an important revenue source
for local governments, there has been concern about the distribution of LOST
revenues: the uneven distribution of sales tax bases may have introduced a new
source of ﬁscal inequality and exacerbated existing ﬁscal disparity. Using
Georgia county data (N5 159, 1970–2000), this study examines whether and
how LOST have affected local ﬁscal disparity. Our ﬁndings suggest that the
effects of LOST on ﬁscal disparity vary with the approach to measure revenue-
raising capacity; thus the issue of LOST distribution is sensitive to the
underlying conceptualization of ‘‘ﬁscal equity.’’
INTRODUCTION
Because of the ‘‘property tax revolt’’ in the late 1970s and early 1980s, many states have
enacted policies that are designed to reduce local property tax burden. As a result, local
governments have been struggling to ﬁnd alternative revenue sources, such as other local
taxes, user charges and fees, and state aids.1 In recent years, local option sales taxes
(LOST) have become important sources of revenue for many local governments. As of
2001, thirty-four states have authorized their local governments to levy LOST.2 The state
of Georgia, for instance, has four types of LOST: (1) the general-purpose LOST
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earmarked for property tax relief,3 (2) the special-purpose LOST (SPLOST) for capital
expenditures,4 (3) the educational-purpose LOST (ELOST) for education, and (4) the
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) tax for public transporta-
tion.5 These taxes are collected by the Georgia Department of Revenue and then dis-
bursed to the counties in accord to the point of collection.6
Whatever the speciﬁc purpose, LOST programs diversify the revenue structures and
enhance the ﬁscal capacity of local governments. Nevertheless, a concern has been raised
about the distribution of LOST revenues. Because sales tax bases are not evenly distributed,
local governments do not reap ‘‘fair shares’’ of beneﬁts from these taxes, and thus the
authorization of LOST may introduce a new source of ﬁscal disparities among jurisdictions.
Moreover, if the dispersion of LOST revenues is positively correlated with that of other
revenues, the LOST may exacerbate existing ﬁscal disparities among localities.
This article examines the effects of LOST on ﬁscal disparities among local govern-
ments using the data of the 159 Georgia counties from 1970 to 2000. We are interested in
the dispersion of revenue-raising capacity rather than that of actual revenues, so the
analysis focuses on tax base distribution of a generic LOST rather than any speciﬁc one.
This study will provide further insight into the LOST as new sources of revenue, and help
state policymakers to determine whether the LOST makes ﬁscal conditions among lo-
calities even more inequitable and whether and how states should take action to offset
these disparities.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews related literature on ﬁscal
disparities, including concepts of ﬁscal disparities and approaches to measure them. The
third section discusses recent studies on the distribution of local option sales tax and its
implications for ﬁscal disparities. The fourth section uses Geographic Information Sys-
tems (GIS) techniques to analyze the distribution of sales tax bases among Georgia
counties and identiﬁes the pattern of sales tax exportation. The ﬁfth section incorporates
the distribution of sales tax base, among others, into two measures of revenue-raising
capacity, and uses three indices of dispersion to assess the level of ﬁscal disparities among
the counties. The ﬁnal section discusses research ﬁndings and addresses theoretical and
policy implications of the study.
3. As of January 2004, all but ﬁve counties in Georgia have adopted the LOST. The ﬁve counties
without the LOST are Cobb, Cherokee, DeKalb, Gwinnett, and Rockdale. For more about the LOST, see
Zhirong Zhao, ‘‘Motivations, Obstacles, and Resources: The Adoption of the General-Purpose LOST in
Georgia Counties,’’ Public Finance Review 33, no. 6 (2005).
4. Changhoon Jung, The Impact of the Special Purpose Local Option Sales Tax (SPLOST) on Local
Government Finance in Georgia, Public Policy Research Series (Athens, GA: Carl Vinson Institute of
Government, University of Georgia, 2002).
5. This tax is levied only in Fulton County and DeKalb County. See Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid
Transit Authority, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (Atlanta, GA: Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid
Transit Authority, 2004).
6. Betty J. Clements and J. Devereux Weeks, County and Municipal Revenue Sources in Georgia (Athens,
GA: Carl Vinson Institute of Government, University of Georgia, 1997).
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FISCAL DISPARITIES: CONCEPTS AND MEASURES
Fiscal disparities among local governments refer to the variation in ﬁscal conditions,
which are normally measured as the ease or difﬁculty a local government faces in pro-
viding a standard package of public services at a reasonable tax rate or tax burden on
residents.7 Fiscal conditions vary greatly from one local government to another. A
widely accepted belief is that higher levels of governments should take action to reduce
the level of such disparity.8 To offset ﬁscal disparities at the local level, many states
currently provide general-purpose revenue-sharing aid to their local governments. Such
programs are intended to direct more aid (per capita) to jurisdictions in poor ﬁscal
conditions than to those in good ﬁscal conditions. To implement equalizing aid pro-
grams, state policymakers need accurate measures of local ﬁscal condition in determining
the extent of disparity and in designing appropriate aid formulas.
Fiscal disparities have been deﬁned in different ways. Historically, the variation in
ﬁscal conditions was often deﬁned as the difference in revenue-raising capacity (RRC),
which is most commonly measured with per capita property tax bases.9 An alternative
deﬁnition is the need-capacity gap, which accounts for variation across communities in
their expenditure need as well as their RRC.10 The latter deﬁnition is more comprehen-
sive but also more complicated to implement, because the expenditure need is harder to
conceptualize and measure than RRC. This study uses only the RRC to measure vari-
ations in ﬁscal conditions among local governments.
Two common approaches have been used to measure the capacity of a locality to raise
revenue from its own sources. One is the Representative-Tax-System approach,11 and the
other is the Income-With-Exporting approach.12 In the former, comparison of RRC is
based on the assumption of similar tax structures and, in particular, tax rates. In the
latter, comparison is based on the assumption of similar tax burdens on residents,
7. Helen F. Ladd, ‘‘Measuring Disparities in the Fiscal Condition of Local Governments,’’ in Fiscal
Equalization for State and Local Government Finance (Westport, CT, and London: Greenwood, Praeger
with National Tax Association, 1994).
8. Helen F. Ladd and John Yinger, ‘‘The Case for Equalizing Aid,’’ in Tax Policy in the Real World
(Cambridge, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); John Yinger, ‘‘On Fiscal Disparities
across Cities,’’ Journal of Urban Economics 19, no. 3 (1986).
9. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Measuring State Fiscal Capacity, (Wash-
ington, DC: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1986); Ronald F. Ferguson and Helen
Ladd, ‘‘Measuring the Fiscal Capacity of U.S. Cities,’’ in Measuring Fiscal Capacity, ed. H. Clyde Reeves
(Boston: Oelgeschlager Gunn & Hain in association with the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1986).
10. Katharine L. Bradbury, et al. ‘‘State Aid to Offset Fiscal Disparities across Communities,’’ National
Tax Journal 37, no. 2 (1984); Ladd, ‘‘Measuring Disparities in the Fiscal Condition of Local Govern-
ments.’’
11. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Measuring State Fiscal Capacity; Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Tax Capacity of the States (Washington, DC: Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1986).
12. Ferguson and Ladd, ‘‘Measuring the Fiscal Capacity of U.S. Cities.’’
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where tax burden is deﬁned as a share of residents’ income. From policy perspectives, the
tax-base approach aims at maintaining a competitive local tax structure, while the income-
base approach targets the reasonable level of local tax burden.13 This study uses both
because the two approaches each yield an important perspective about our subject of
interest.
LOCAL OPTION SALES TAXES AND FISCAL DISPARITIES
Despite the wide use of LOST in many states, few studies have been conducted to examine
the distribution of local sales tax base or revenues. We only found a few articles on the
cases of Iowa and Georgia, with their analyses emphasizing education-purpose LOST
levied by school districts. In Iowa, Craft ﬁnds that the collection of sales tax revenue
progressively concentrates in large retail centers rather than small communities.14 As a
result, Iowa counties vary signiﬁcantly in their ability to use LOST revenue: counties with
large sales tax bases are able to reduce their property tax rates, which attracts more
residents and in turn generates even more LOST revenue. Also in Iowa, Artz and Stone
examine the scope of sales tax exportation in ﬁscal year 2002 and ﬁnds that only 20
percent of Iowa counties had a retail trade ‘‘surplus,’’ which means sales in the county
amounted to more than county residents spent, while the remaining 80 counties had retail
sales ‘‘leakage.’’15 Consequently, LOST in Iowa create inequalities in public funding
because they redistribute tax dollars from ‘‘retail poor’’ areas to the ‘‘retail rich.’’ Ruben-
stein and Freeman examine the education-purpose LOST (ESPLOST) in Georgia and go
further by relating the distribution of LOST revenues to that of property tax revenues.16
They assess the dispersion of total school district revenue (per full-time equivalent
student) for 1999 and 2000 with four measures of dispersion, and ﬁnd that each equity
measure in each year indicates larger inter-district disparities when the potential
ESPLOST revenue is added to operating revenue. The results suggest that introducing
local option sales taxes is likely to increase already existing differences in local ﬁscal
capacity.
It is not surprising that extant studies of the distribution of LOST revenues are all
conducted in the context of school districts, as issues of ﬁscal disparities have been
13. Ladd, ‘‘Measuring Disparities in the Fiscal Condition of Local Governments’’; Thomas A. Downes
and Thomas F. Pogue, ‘‘Intergovernmental Aid to Reduce Fiscal Disparities: Problems of Deﬁnition and
Measurement,’’ Public Finance Quarterly 20, no. 4 (1992).
14. Matthew M. Craft, ‘‘Lost and Found: The Unequal Distribution of Local Option Sales Tax Rev-
enue among Iowa Schools,’’ Iowa Law Review, no. 88 (2002).
15. Georgeanne Artz and Kenneth E. Stone, ‘‘An Analysis of the Transfer of Funds from Weak Retail
Counties to Strong Retail Counties in Iowa via Local Option Sales Taxes,’’ paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of American Agricultural Economics Association, Montreal, Quebec, July 27–30, 2003.
16. Ross Rubenstein and Catherine Freeman, ‘‘Do Local Sales Taxes for Education Increase Inequities?
The Case of Georgia’s ESPLOST,’’ Journal of Education Finance 28 (2003).
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traditionally more visible in education ﬁnance. However, ﬁscal disparity among general-
purpose governments is equally undesirable, and many states have created state aid
programs to mitigate this problem.17 Thus the study of the LOST’s effect on ﬁscal
disparities should not be conﬁned to education ﬁnance.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODS
Using ﬁscal and socioeconomic data of the 159 Georgia counties during the 1970–2000
period, this study addresses three related research questions: (1) how are LOST revenues
distributed across counties? (2) how can we incorporate LOST revenues in measuring
local ﬁscal capacity? and (3) do the LOST make ﬁscal capacity even more disparate
among counties? The study seeks to integrate three methods of inquiry. First, the dis-
tribution of LOST revenues is analyzed through Geographical Information System
(GIS), which enhances our ability to discover spatial patterns that may be hard to discern
from mere statistical analysis. Second, in measuring RRC, two major competing ap-
proachesFRepresentative-Tax-System and Income-With-ExportingFare both applied
for comparison of the results. Finally, the dispersion of ﬁscal capacity among localities
will be assessed with three inequality indicesFthe relative mean deviation, the Gini
coefﬁcient, and the Mehran Index.18
Data of this study are from several sources. GIS-base maps of Georgia counties
are from the Georgia GIS Clearinghouse.19 Taxable sales base, property tax base,
and property tax millage rates are from the Statistical Report published by the
Georgia Department of Revenue. The source of socioeconomic variables is the
Georgia County Guide. All income and ﬁscal ﬁgures are in 2000 constant
dollars.20
DISTRIBUTION OF SALES TAX BASES IN GEORGIA COUNTIES
A common presupposition is that taxable sales bases and hence LOST revenues are
disproportionately conglomerated in areas that are (1) more urbanized and (2) regional
retail centers. This presupposition has been in general conﬁrmed by recent equity studies
17. Ladd, ‘‘Measuring Disparities in the Fiscal Condition of Local Governments.’’
18. Robert Berne and Leanna Stiefel, The Measurement of Equity in School Finance: Conceptual,
Methodological, and Empirical Dimensions (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984); Yaakov
Kondor, ‘‘An Old-New Measure of Income Inequality,’’ Econometrica 39, no. 6 (1971); Farhad Mehran,
‘‘Linear Measures of Income Inequality,’’ Econometrica 44, no. 4 (1976).
19. Available at the website of Georgia GIS Clearinghouse. Available from: https://gis1.state.ga.us/
login.asp: accessed 20 September 2006.
20. The deﬂator used is the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Available at the website of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Department of Labor: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/: accessed 20 September 2006.
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of school district ﬁnance.21 In the context of Georgia counties, however, it is subjected to
re-examination for two reasons. First, in studies of local government ﬁscal equity we
look at ‘‘individual’’ ﬁscal data that have accounted for the size of service-receiving units
in different localities. For school districts, the basic units are pupils or equivalent mea-
sures; for counties, the units are individual residents. Although the number of pupils is
normally larger in counties with a larger population, this is not always the case. There-
fore, ﬁscal disparity as measured by per-pupil revenues may not be comparable to ﬁscal
disparity measured by per-capita revenues. Second, ‘‘urban areas’’ and ‘‘retail centers’’
have often been implicitly treated as identical; this treatment may be problematic. While
retail centers are normally located in relatively urbanized areas, not all urban areas serve
as retail centers; rural areas may also have regional retail centers where big cities are far
away.
Total versus Per Capita Tax Base and Patterns of Distribution
Figure 1a shows the taxable sales base of Georgia counties in 2000. The sales bases are
distributed extremely unevenly across counties, with a clear pattern of ‘‘one-dominant-
pole’’Fthe Atlanta Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The sales tax base of Fulton
FIGURE 1
Distribution of Taxable Sales Bases among Georgia Counties in 2000.
Panel a: Total taxable sales base (million dollar). Panel b: Per capita taxable sales base
(thousand dollar)
21. Artz and Stone, ‘‘An Analysis of the Transfer of Funds from Weak Retail Counties to Strong Retail
Counties in Iowa Via Local Option Sales Taxes’’; Craft, ‘‘Lost and Found: The Unequal Distribution of
Local Option Sales Tax Revenue among Iowa Schools’’; Rubenstein and Freeman, ‘‘Do Local Sales Taxes
for Education Increase Inequities? The Case of Georgia’s ESPLOST.’’
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County, where most of Atlanta City is located, is over $14 billion, while that of
Echols County is less than $1 millionFa difference of over 15,000 times. The six counties
that have the highest sales tax bases account for more than half of the state’s total,
ﬁve of them are in the Atlanta MSA.22 Georgia counties differ signiﬁcantly in population
size. Figure 1b shows the per capita tax base in each county, looking more
evenly distributed than in Figure 1a. The variation among counties is much less ex-
treme: the highest per capita sales tax base (Cobb County) is over $20,000, while
the lowest (Echols County) is about $200Fa difference of 100 times. Unlike the one-
dominant-pole pattern in Figure 1a, however, multiple ‘‘sales centers’’ emerge through-
out the state.
Several observations stand out about these sales centers. First, there is a clear
link between sales centers and interstate highways. Second, urban counties where major
cities (population 450,000) are located tend to have much higher per capita sales
tax bases than other counties. Third, it is worth noting that sales centers are not
necessarily urban counties. Figure 1b shows several sales centers in southern
Georgia, most part of which is very rural. It seems that the Atlanta metro area serves
as the shopping center for northern Georgia, but rural residents in the deep south
of the state may rely more on nearby retail centers, probably because these areas are far
from Atlanta (150 to 300 miles away) and thus beyond its service radius. This
result suggests that the regional conglomeration of sales tax bases is constrained by
distance.
Historical Changes
The ﬁrst LOST in Georgia, the general-purpose local option sales tax, was authorized in
1975, and a variety of other LOST were authorized thereafter.23 Figure 2 offers a snap-
shot of how the distribution of tax base has changed in the post-LOST period. In the
northern, more urbanized part of the state, the traditional sales center Fulton County
became less dominant over the decades of urban sprawl. In the southern, mostly rural
part of the state, however, the distribution seemed more polarized with the emergence of
several sales centers in the last two decades. Overall, the conglomeration of retail ac-
tivities has gradually shifted from a one-pole to a multiple-pole pattern. A detailed
explanation of the spatial patterns is beyond the scope of this study; nevertheless, the
results suggest that the distribution of sales tax base has far more nuance than has been
commonly assumed.
22. These ﬁve counties are Fulton, Cobb, Gwinnett, DeKalb, and Clayton. The only exception is
Chatham County where Savannah City is located.
23. Zhirong Zhao, ‘‘Motivations, Obstacles, and Resources: The Adoption of the General-Purpose
Local Option Sales Tax in Georgia Counties,’’ Public Finance Review 33, no. 6 (2005).
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Tax Exportation
Another indicator of the sales base distribution is the level of sales tax exporta-
tionFsales tax burdens ‘‘exported’’ outside a jurisdiction.24 We calculate tax exportation
in county i in year j as the difference between its actual sales tax revenue (STRVNij) and
the hypothetical tax revenue ðSTRVNijÞ, which is the amount of sales tax proceeds in the
absence of tax exportation. Assuming that all counties adopt a 1 percent LOST, STRVNi
is 1 percent of the taxable sales tax base (STBASEij), while STRVN

ij is calculated based
on the assumption of the average sales-income ratio (SIRATIOi) in year j. It is assumed that
FIGURE 2
Per Capita Taxable Sales Base in Georgia in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 (Thousand dollar)
24. Positive tax exportation (‘‘sales surplus’’) occurs when a county collects sales tax revenue from non-
residents; in contrast, negative tax exportation (‘‘sales deﬁcit’’) means a county loses sales tax revenue to
other counties.
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without tax exportation the sales tax base in a county would be a certain proportion of its
total personal income (PINCOMEij).
25 The formula can be expressed as follows:
EXPORTii ¼ STRVNij  STRVNij
¼ STBASEij  1 percent PINCOMEij  SIRATIOj  1 percent ð1Þ
Figure 3a shows per capita sales tax exportation in 2000.26 Seventy-six of the 159
Georgia counties had positive tax exportation while 83 had negative exportation. At one
extreme, McDufﬁe County, adjacent to the Augusta MSA, had the highest tax expor-
tation by collecting $180 per capita, over half of the amount ($96) from nonresidents. At
the other extreme, Chattahoochee County (adjacent to the Columbus–Muscogee Met-
ropolitan Area) actually collected only $5 per capita sales tax while its hypothetical
revenue is $105. Residents of the county seemed to have essentially done all their shop-
ping elsewhere, most probably in the neighboring Muscogee County which had $65 per
capita tax exportation.
Comparing Figures 3a and 1b, it is not surprising to see that most sales-center coun-
ties enjoy positive tax exportation. A striking exception is Fulton County: though it has
the highest average personal income and thus the largest sales tax base, the county
FIGURE3
Distribution of Sales Tax Exportation and Property Tax Capacity (2000).
(Big cities refer to cities with 50,000 population or above)
Panel a: Per capita sales tax exported in Georgia counties (dollar). Panel b: Per capita
property tax capacity in Georgia counties (dollar)
25. Although one may expect that low-income families will spend a higher share of income on sales tax
revenue, the aggregate result at the county level is more complicated. In this data we ﬁnd that the re-
lationship between the sales-income share and per capita income among the counties is roughly U-shaped
(the share is highest for median personal income) rather than linear.
26. The exportation can be in-state or out-of-state. Making this distinction, however, will not affect the
results of analysis because we focus on the ‘‘net’’ exportation for each county and the corresponding change
in its revenue capacity, not on the direction of exportation.
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actually ‘‘leaked’’ sales tax revenues to its neighbors. Contrary to ‘‘common sense,’’ most
Georgia counties that beneﬁt signiﬁcantly from sales tax exportation are not those lo-
cated around the metropolitan Atlanta area, but those that serve as regional sales centers
in the south.
MEASURING FISCAL CAPACITY OF GEORGIA COUNTIES
Fiscal capacity in Georgia counties is measured in two approaches, Representative-Tax-
System (RTS) and Income-With-Exporting (IWE). According to the RTS approach, if a
county is empowered to use only the property tax, we can measure its RRC as its
property tax base times a standard tax rate, such as the statewide average property tax
rate. Extending this approach to multiple taxes, revenue-raising capacity (RRC) would
be the weighted sum of all tax bases (BASEik) per capita, the weights being the rep-
resentative tax rates (tjk).
27 The formula can be expressed as follows:
RRCi ¼ SktikBASEik ð2Þ
This study examines only revenues from the property tax and the local option sales
tax. Thus RRC is calculated as the weighted sum of per capita property tax base
(PTBASEi) and per capita taxable sales base (STBASEi). The weight for the property tax
is the average millage rate for the year (MILLAGEj); for the taxable sales base it is 1
percent:
RRCij ¼ PTBASEij MILLAGEj þ STBASEiij  1 percent ð3Þ
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of RRC in 2000, as measured with the RTS
approach. On average, sales tax accounts for 16.2 percent of the total RRC, which is
slightly higher for MSA counties (18.3) than for other counties (15.9), indicating that
metropolitan counties can raise a higher proportion of their revenues from LOST.
Table 2 (the left side) shows that the correlation is low for these two taxes (r5 0.27).
This occurs because the counties with highest property tax capacity tend to have only
modest level of sales tax capacity (see the ﬁrst scatterplot in Figure 4).28 GIS analysis
provides additional information about spatial patterns of the two measures: the distri-
bution of property tax revenues is more ‘‘inter-regional’’Fnorthern counties in general
have much higher property tax revenues (Figure 3b); the distribution of sales tax rev-
enues is more ‘‘intra-regional’’ because sales centers are scattered throughout the state
(Figure 1b).
The IWE approach measures RRC as the per capita revenue that local governments
could raise if they imposed a standard tax burden on their residents, augmented by the
27. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Measuring State Fiscal Capacity; Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Tax Capacity of the States.
28. Among the ten counties with highest property tax capacity, only three are located in the Atlanta
MSA.
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amount that they would generate by exporting tax burdens to nonresidents.29 The ra-
tionale for this approach is that local residents’ ability to pay is typically measured by
their income. If we assume local residents work and shop only in the jurisdiction where
they live, regardless of which tax bases are actually used, all taxes are ultimately paid out
of the income of local residents, who can only bear a certain tax burden as a percentage
of their incomes. Relaxing the assumption that consumers live, shop, and work in the
same community opens up the possibility of tax exporting, because local governments
may also generate revenue from nonresidents. More precisely, in Ferguson and Ladd,
RRC of county i is calculated as the percentage burden (K) on residents multiplied by: (1)
the per capita income of local residents (Yi), and (2) one plus the ratio of tax exportation
(ei), as follows:
RRCi ¼ KYið1þ eiÞ ð4Þ
Because the ratio of tax exportation (ei) is difﬁcult to measure, this study takes
Ferguson and Ladd’s approach with a twist. We assume that a Georgia county can
only raise its revenue up to a certain proportion (BURDEN) of personal income
TABLE1
Descriptive Statistics of Representative-Tax-System (RTS) Revenue-Raising Capacity
Measures (2000)
Revenue-raising capacity based on RTS
Property tax
capacity
Sales tax
capacity
Total revenue
capacity
All counties
Maximum $1,527.7 $203.7 $1,593.8
Minimum $53.8 $2.2 $59.2
Mean $445.4 (83.9%) $85.7 (16.1%) $531.0 (100%)
Standard deviation $175.7 $46.7 $193.4
In MSA
Maximum $816.6 $203.7 $949.8
Minimum $53.8 $5.4 $59.2
Mean $477.0 (81.7%) $107.1 (18.3%) $584.2 (100%)
Standard deviation $140.7 $50.0 $169.7
Others
Maximum $1,527.7 $184.2 $1,593.8
Minimum $203.3 $2.2 $237.5
Mean $434.4 (84.7%) $78.2 (15.3%) $512.6 (100%)
Standard deviation $185.6 $43.2 $198.3
29. Ferguson and Ladd, ‘‘Measuring the Fiscal Capacity of U.S. Cities.’’
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(PINCOME), plus the amount of tax exported outside its jurisdiction (EXPORT). The
formula is expressed as follows:
RRCij ¼ PINCOMEij  BURDENj þ EXPORTij ð5Þ
The amount of tax exporting, EXPORTij, is calculated according to Formula (1). The
standard tax burden, BURDENj is the average value of tax burden in each county that is
calculated as total tax revenue (property tax revenue plus sales tax revenue) divided by
personal income.
BURDENj ¼ Avg ðPTRVNij þ STRVNijÞ=PINCOMEij
  ð6Þ
TABLE 2
Bivariate Correlations between Measures of Revenue-Raising Capacity (2000)
Representative-Tax-System
(RTS) Revenue Capacity
Property tax
capacity
Sales tax
capacity
All counties
Sales tax capacity 0.27 1
Total revenue capacity 0.97 0.48
In MSA
Sales tax capacity 0.46 1
Total revenue capacity 0.97 0.68
Others
Sales tax capacity 0.19 1
Total revenue capacity 0.98 0.40
Income-With-Exporting (IWE) Revenue Capacity
Income-based capacity Tax exportation
All counties
Tax exportation 0.27 1
Total revenue capacity 0.97 0.51
In MSA
Tax exportation 0.04 1
Total revenue capacity 0.97 0.30
Others
Tax exportation 0.49 1
Total revenue capacity 0.95 0.74
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Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of RRC in 2000, as measured by IWE approach.
For all counties, no matter in MSA or rural areas, tax exportation in general is dominated by
the income-based revenue capacity, which accounts for above 99 percent of IWE RRC. In
Table 2 (the right side), we see that tax exportation and income-based revenue capacity are
modestly correlated for counties in rural areas (r50.49), but not at all correlated for those
within MSA areas (r50.04). For all counties, the correlation between the two measures are
low (r50.27), because the counties with highest income-based revenue capacity tend to have
only modest level of tax exportation, as is shown in Figure 4.
DISPERSION ANALYSIS OF RRC
This section examines the dispersion of RRC across the state, with or without LOST
proceeds. In particular, we want to see (1) how ﬁscal (revenue) disparities are associated
with LOST proceeds; (2) how dispersed are property tax proceeds or the income-based
revenue capacity; and (3) whether and how the introduction of LOST exacerbates ﬁscal
disparities, as measured by either RTS or IWE approach, across Georgia counties.
To measure the disparity of RRC, this study employs three dispersion indices: the
relative mean deviation, the Gini coefﬁcient, and the Mehran Index.30 The relative mean
deviation is the sum of the absolute value of the differences between each object (per-
sonal income) and the mean value of the object (average personal income), as a pro-
portion of total values (total personal income) in the distribution.31 The Gini coefﬁcient
is calculated as the area between the Lorenz curve and a 45-degree line (representing
FIGURE4
Scatterplots between Measures of Revenue-Raising Capacity in 2000
30. This study treats each county as a unit for inequality analysis. The dispersion measures are not
weighted by population.
31. For details about the relative mean deviation, see Kondor, ‘‘An Old-New Measure of Income
Inequality.’’
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perfect equality) divided by the area under the line. Thus the coefﬁcient represents the
difference between the actual distribution of certain object (per capita tax base or tax
revenue) and the distribution if all individuals (counties) received equal amount of that
object.32 The Mehran Index is like the Gini coefﬁcient with a twist. It weights the
inequality among the poor heavier than inequality among the rich, following the Pigou-
Dalton transfer principle that assumes a positive transfer of income from a richer to a
poorer decreases income inequality.33 These indices are often used together in inequality
studies because they represent a diversity of value judgments about what would be
considered ‘‘fair.’’ In this study, perfect equality would exist if all Georgia counties had
the same level of RRC, while the three indices are used to measure in slightly different
ways how far the actual distribution is deviated from the perfectly equal distribution. For
all these indices, higher values indicate higher levels of inequality.
Results of dispersion analysis based on the RTS approach are shown in Figure 5,
which includes three diagrams, each representing the level of inequality as measured by
TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics of Income-With-Exporting (IWE) Revenue-Raising Capacity
Measures (2000)
Revenue-raising capacity based on IWE
Income-based capacity Tax exportation Total revenue capacity
All counties
Maximum $1,335.4 $95.5 $1,333.3
Minimum $366.2 –$100.0 $324.4
Mean $622.3 (99.6%) $2.4 (0.4%) $624.6 (100%)
Standard deviation $130.2 $38.8 $145.6
In MSA
Maximum $1,335.4 $92.1 $1,333.3
Minimum $477.1 –$100.0 $442.2
Mean $745.6 (99.0%) $7.3 (1.0%) $752.9 (100%)
Standard deviation $165.2 $43.9 $172.8
Others
Maximum $874.0 $95.5 $915.9
Minimum $366.2 –$67.3 $324.4
Mean $579.4 (99.9%) $0.6 (0.1%) $580.0 (100%)
Standard deviation $79.8 $37.0 $103.1
32. Berne and Stiefel, The Measurement of Equity in School Finance: Conceptual, Methodological, and
Empirical Dimensions.
33. For further discussion, see Farhad Mehran, ‘‘Linear Measures of Income Inequality,’’ Econometrica
44, no. 4 (1976).
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one dispersion index. In each diagram there are three trend lines: the diamond dash trend
line shows the dispersion of property tax revenue capacity (levied at the average millage
rate); the square solid line shows the dispersion of LOST proceeds (levied at 1 percent tax
rate); and the triangle solid line shows the dispersion of the composite RRC based on the
RTS approach. We can see trend lines in the same diagram to compare ﬁscal disparities
associated with different sources of revenue, or examine the ﬂuctuation of a trend line to
see how ﬁscal disparities change over time. However, trend lines in different diagrams are
not comparable.
Relative mean deviation
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Property tax Sales tax Total revenue
Gini coefficient
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
Property tax Sales tax Total revenue
Mehran Index
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
Property tax Sales tax Total revenue
FIGURE5
Fiscal Disparities with Representative-Tax-System Approach (1970–2000)
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As Figure 5 shows, the patterns of dispersion are consistent in the three diagrams.
Property tax revenues show a general trend of increasing inequality from 1970 to 1990;
then it ﬂuctuated in the last decade. For LOST proceeds, the level of inequality grows
over time and is much higher than that of the property tax especially in recent years.
However, the composite measure of both the property tax and LOST is the lowest in all
diagrams, which suggests that adding LOST revenue to property tax revenues does not
exacerbate the ﬁscal inequality. Recall that the two tax bases are somewhat positively
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FIGURE 6
Fiscal Disparities with Income-With-Exporting Approach (1970–2000)
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correlated (r5 0.27 in FY 2000), how would adding the two together produce a more
equal distribution than either one individually? The explanation lies in the spatial dis-
tribution of these tax bases. While sales bases are more dispersed than property tax
bases, the two tax bases are dispersed in different spatial dimensions. As Figures 1b and
3b show, sales bases concentrate on a number of retail-center counties, most of which are
not in the top echelon of property tax capacity that are key drivers of original ﬁscal
disparity. In Figure 4, we see that the outlier counties with extremely high property tax
capacity tend to have only modest level of sales tax base, and thus adding LOST pro-
ceeds partially offsets the ﬁscal inequality associated with property tax revenues
(Figure 7).34 We should also note that in the last decade the dispersion of RTS RRC
seems to gradually converge with that of property tax revenues. The offsetting effect
seems to decrease over time as the dispersion of LOST revenue becomes increasingly
unequal.
Figure 6 shows the results of dispersion analyses of RRC based on the IWE approach.
Each diagram represents the results of dispersion analysis during the 1970–2000 period
using one dispersion index. In these diagrams, the dash lines depict the dispersion of
income-based revenue capacity, which is calculated as a percentage of personal income,
with the assumption of standard tax burden and zero tax exportation. The solid lines
show the dispersion of IWE RRC when sales tax exportation is added to income-based
revenues.
Analyses again show consistent patterns across indices. For income-based revenues,
the level of inequality has ﬂuctuated but generally grown over the past four decades.
FIGURE7
Property Tax Capacity and Sales Tax Capacity in FY 2000
34. An intuitive analogy is that dispersion functions like ﬁnancial risk; so it is possible that adding two
dispersed items produces a more equal distribution, as is the case that adding two positively correlated
stocks may produce a lower level of (unsystematic) risk than either one individually.
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Because the income-based revenue covariates with the average personal income, this
measure also indicates similar changes in income disparity across Georgia counties over
the time period. Adding the amount of sales tax exportation to income-based revenue
comes up with the IWE revenue-raised capacity, which is represented as red solid lines.
In all three diagrams, the solid lines are much higher than the dash lines. It suggests that
the introduction of LOST signiﬁcantly increases the level of ﬁscal disparities across
counties.
While Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the trend of ﬁscal disparities over two decades, many
people would be more interested in the changes that have occurred in recent years, when
a common trend of increased ﬁscal inequality is shown in both ﬁgures. In Figure 6 the
dispersion of IWE (income-based) RRC has become much higher since 1995; this ﬁnding
is consistent with recent reports about the growing state income disparities in the United
States.35 In Figure 5 we see a similar trend of growing disparities associated with prop-
erty tax revenues and LOST proceeds. Moreover, Figure 5 shows that the dispersion of
LOST proceeds is growing much faster than that of property tax revenues. This may
have occurred because of the income disparities in the same period (as indicated by
Figure 6), because sales tax is more income-elastic than the property tax.36 Further
investigations, of course, are needed to verify these hypotheses.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This study examines the effects of LOST on local ﬁscal disparities. Analysis based on the
RTS approach shows that the dispersion of LOST revenue is higher than that of prop-
erty tax revenue, and it grows over time. Although adding LOST may not have exac-
erbated ﬁscal inequality associated with the property tax in the past two decades, it may
do so if the current trend of growing LOST disparity continues. Analysis with the IWE
approach, however, demonstrates that adding sales tax exportation signiﬁcantly in-
creases the dispersion associated with the income-based revenue, that is, introducing the
LOST does exacerbate revenue disparity. This study is conducted on Georgia’s 159
counties. Similar studies have yet to be conducted in other states with LOST before the
ﬁndings are generalizable. Still, the study bears implications for states that are concerned
with ﬁscal disparities associate with LOST. One possible solution is for the state to
collect a standardized rate of sales tax and then distribute the revenue on a per capita
basis. This method, however, essentially turns the LOST into a state sales tax. A second
option is for the state to create a speciﬁc formula that not only retains the ‘‘local option’’
35. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and Economic Policy Institute, ‘‘State Income Inequality
Continued to Grow in Most States in the 1990s, Despite Economic Growth and Tight Labor Markets’’
(Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2002; available from: http://www.cbpp.org/1-18-
00sfp.htm: accessed 7 January 2008).
36. National Conference of State Legislatures, Critical Issues in State-Local Fiscal Policy: A Guide to
Local Option Taxes (Denver, CO: National Conference of State Legislatures, 1997).
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feature of the sales tax but also offsets, at least partially, the disparities of its proceeds.
To create such a formula, it is critical to have an accurate measure of ﬁscal inequality. In
doing so, policymakers should choose an approach that ﬁts their conceptualization of
‘‘ﬁscal equity,’’ in particular, whether they are attempting to maintain a competitive tax
structure (then use RTS) or a reasonable tax burden at the local level (then use IWE),37
because the measure of ﬁscal disparity is sensitive to the approach that is used. Lastly,
considering the ‘‘intra-regional’’ pattern of sales base distribution, a state with a vast
rural area, like Georgia, may provide incentives for the development of rural sales
centers, which serves not only as an economic development policy but also as a means to
mitigate ﬁscal disparities between its urban and rural localities.
This study has several limitations. First, it examines only disparities on the revenue
side, which are clearly not the whole picture. For example, counties in the Atlanta
metropolitan area have higher RRC, but it is also possible that these counties have
higher expenditure needs because of the level of urbanization.38 If this is the case, ﬁscal
disparities measured by the need-capacity gap might be less severe. Second, this study
depicts the change of ﬁscal disparities over three decades, but it does not provide a
systematic explanation of the change. Further investigations should be undertaken to
provide a causal model of ﬁscal disparities. Third, this study focuses on the dispersion of
revenue capacity, but we may wonder how the actual LOST revenues reduce or exac-
erbate disparities in actual property tax revenues in Georgia, which will be explored in
subsequent studies.
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